July 17, 2009

Zachary Shore is Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Senior Fellow at the Institute of European Studies, University of California, Berkeley. He previously served on the Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of State. He is the author of What Hitler Knew: The Battle for Information in Nazi Foreign Policy, and Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe. His most recent book is Blunder: Why Smart People Make Bad Decisions.
In this interview with D.J. Grothe, Zachary Shore talks about decision making, both at the personal and international level, and shares reasons even smart people make bad decisions. He describes what the field of history uniquely reveals about the tools needed to avoid decision-making blunders. He details the many ways that people fall into "cognition traps," including "exposure anxiety," "causefusion," "flatview," and "static cling," drawing from examples from individuals, international politics and statecraft, and corporate America. He identifies the various rigid mindsets that cause the cognition traps. And he suggests solutions to avoid blunders in thinking, including increasing one's empathy, imagination, and flexibility.
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Comments from the CFI Forums
The subject is a fascinating one and I was looking forward to what I thought would be an insightful interview as usual. However, my hopes were dashed for several reasons, relating to the interviewee:
1. The historical terms that he used to explain errors, such as “exposure avoidance” and “cause fusion”, are in effect terms that the author invented for existing known concepts in cognitive psychology. For example, exposure avoidance is just a subset of cognitive dissonance theory. And “cause fusion” and black and white thinking are familiar to mental health professionals who use cognitive behavioral therapy, based on the work of Beck and others.
2. In the interview several examples are brought forth in the realm of international relations. Unfortunately the treatment of the examples was extremely superficial and oversimplified. He also gave examples from the world of medicine which were either misleading or mundane. I am a medical professional, and researchers are very well aware of the difference between correlation and causation.
I would have like to have heard a more detailed and scholarly analysis of historical events, for example what lead to Chamberlain’s deal with the Nazis or something similar.
I just downloaded the book from Audible.com. I look forward to “reading” it during commutes.
The subject is a fascinating one and I was looking forward to what I thought would be an insightful interview as usual. However, my hopes were dashed for several reasons, relating to the interviewee:
1. The historical terms that he used to explain errors, such as “exposure avoidance” and “cause fusion”, are in effect terms that the author invented for existing known concepts in cognitive psychology. For example, exposure avoidance is just a subset of cognitive dissonance theory. And “cause fusion” and black and white thinking are familiar to mental health professionals who use cognitive behavioral therapy, based on the work of Beck and others.
2. In the interview several examples are brought forth in the realm of international relations. Unfortunately the treatment of the examples was extremely superficial and oversimplified. He also gave examples from the world of medicine which were either misleading or mundane. I am a medical professional, and researchers are very well aware of the difference between correlation and causation.
I would have like to have heard a more detailed and scholarly analysis of historical events, for example what lead to Chamberlain’s deal with the Nazis or something similar.
DrJ help me to understand your post a little further. In regard to your “#1” I am not sure what to make of the fact that the author used ‘new’ terms where old terms could have been used. I don’t see how this affects his arguments.
Also, you say that researchers are very well aware of the difference between correlation and causation. That is true, I would not argue that. But what the author was arguing was that researchers may not have a complete understanding and awareness of the differences between the two. And I’m not sure how a ‘superficial and oversimplified…treatment… [of] examples [from] international relations” has any correlation (pun?) to the latter argument.
Thanks.